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Abstract—Items shared through Social Media may affect more than one user’s privacy — e.g., photos that depict multiple users,
comments that mention multiple users, events in which multiple users are invited, etc. The lack of multi-party privacy management
support in current mainstream Social Media infrastructures makes users unable to appropriately control to whom these items are actually
shared or not. Computational mechanisms that are able to merge the privacy preferences of multiple users into a single policy for an
item can help solve this problem. However, merging multiple users’ privacy preferences is not an easy task, because privacy preferences
may conflict, so methods to resolve conflicts are needed. Moreover, these methods need to consider how users’ would actually reach an
agreement about a solution to the conflict in order to propose solutions that can be acceptable by all of the users affected by the item to
be shared. Current approaches are either too demanding or only consider fixed ways of aggregating privacy preferences. In this paper,
we propose the first computational mechanism to resolve conflicts for multi-party privacy management in Social Media that is able to
adapt to different situations by modelling the concessions that users make to reach a solution to the conflicts. We also present results
of a user study in which our proposed mechanism outperformed other existing approaches in terms of how many times each approach
matched users’ behaviour.
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1 INTRODUCTION
HUNDREDS of billions of items that are uploaded toSocial Media are co-owned by multiple users [1],
yet only the user that uploads the item is allowed to
set its privacy settings (i.e., who can access the item).
This is a massive and serious problem as users’ pri-
vacy preferences for co-owned items usually conflict, so
applying the preferences of only one party risks such
items being shared with undesired recipients, which
can lead to privacy violations with severe consequences
(e.g., users losing their jobs, being cyberstalked, etc.) [2].
Examples of items include photos that depict multiple
people, comments that mention multiple users, events in
which multiple users are invited, etc. Multi-party privacy
management is, therefore, of crucial importance for users
to appropriately preserve their privacy in Social Media.
There is recent evidence that users very often negoti-
ate collaboratively to achieve an agreement on privacy
settings for co-owned information in Social Media [3],
[4]. In particular, users are known to be generally open
to accommodate other users’ preferences, and they are
willing to make some concessions to reach an agree-
ment depending on the specific situation [4]. However,
current Social Media privacy controls solve this kind of
situations by only applying the sharing preferences of
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the party that uploads the item, so users are forced to
negotiate manually using other means such as e-mail,
SMSs, phone calls, etc. [5] — e.g., Alice and Bob may
exchange some e-mails to discuss whether or not they
actually share their photo with Charlie. The problem
with this is that negotiating manually all the conflicts
that appear in the everyday life may be time-consuming
because of the high number of possible shared items and
the high number of possible accessors (or targets) to be
considered by users [2]; e.g., a single average user in
Facebook has more than 140 friends and uploads more
than 22 photos [6].
Computational mechanisms that can automate the ne-
gotiation process have been identified as one of the
biggest gaps in privacy management in social media [3],
[4], [5], [7], [8]. The main challenge is to propose solutions
that can be accepted most of the time by all the users
involved in an item (e.g., all users depicted in a photo),
so that users are forced to negotiate manually as little
as possible, thus minimising the burden on the user to
resolve multi-party privacy conflicts.
Very recent related literature proposed mechanisms to
resolve multi-party privacy conflicts in social media [2],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. Some of them [9], [10] need too
much human intervention during the conflict resolution
process, by requiring users to solve the conflicts manually
or close to manually; e.g., participating in difficult-to-
comprehend auctions for each and every co-owned item.
Other approaches to resolve multi-party privacy conflicts
are more automated [2], [11], [12], but they only consider
one fixed way of aggregating user’s privacy preferences
(e.g., veto voting [2]) without considering how users
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2would actually achieve compromise and the concessions
they might be willing to make to achieve it depending
on the specific situation. Only [13] considers more than
one way of aggregating users’ privacy preferences, but
the user that uploads the item chooses the aggregation
method to be applied, which becomes a unilateral deci-
sion without considering the preferences of the others.
In this paper, we present the first computational mech-
anism for social media that, given the individual privacy
preferences of each user involved in an item, is able to
find and resolve conflicts by applying a different conflict
resolution method based on the concessions users’ may
be willing to make in different situations. We also present
a user study comparing our computational mechanism
of conflict resolution and other previous approaches to
what users would do themselves manually in a number
of situations. The results obtained suggest our proposed
mechanism significantly outperformed other previously
proposed approaches in terms of the number of times it
matched participants’ behaviour in the study.
2 BACKGROUND
Assume a finite set of users U , where a finite subset of
negotiating users N ⊆ U , negotiate whether they should
grant a finite subset of target users1 T ⊆ U access to a
particular co-owned item. For instance, Alice and Bob
(negotiating users) negotiate about whether they should
grant Charlie (target user) access to a photo of them
depicted together. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we will consider a negotiation for one item
over the course of this paper — e.g., a photo that depicts
the negotiating users together — and hence, we do not
include any additional notation for the item in question.
2.1 Individual Privacy Preferences
Negotiating users have their own individual privacy
preferences about the item — i.e., to whom of their
online friends they would like to share the item if
they were to decide it unilaterally. In this paper, we
assume negotiating users specify their individual privacy
preferences using group-based access control, which is
nowadays mainstream in Social Media (e.g., Facebook
lists or Google+ circles), to highlight the practical ap-
plicability of our proposed approach. However, other
access control approaches for Social Media could also be
used in conjunction with our proposed mechanism —
e.g., relationship-based access control [14], [15], [16] as
already shown in [17], or (semi-)automated approaches
like [18], [19], [20]. Note also that our approach does not
necessarily need users to specify their individual privacy
preferences for each and every item separately, they
1. We defined the set of target users as a subset of the users to remain
as general as possible; i.e., without forcing it to satisfy a particular
property. However, the set of target users could be further qualified as a
particular subset of users satisfying any property without changing the
subsequent formalisation; e.g., the set of target users could be defined
as the union of all of the negotiating users’ online friends.
could also specify the same preferences for collections
or categories of items for convenience according to the
access control model being used —e.g., Facebook users
can specify preferences for a whole photo album at once.
Mainstream Social Media (Facebook, Google+, etc.)
have predefined groups and also allow users to de-
fine their own groups, each of which is composed of
a set of friends. Access to items (photos, etc.) can be
granted/denied to groups, individuals or both (e.g., all
Friends have access to a photo except Charlie). We
formally define a group G ⊆ U as a set of users, and
the set of all groups defined by a particular user u as
Gu = {G1, . . . , Gl}, so that
⋂
G∈Gu G = ∅. For instance,
Alice may have defined the following groups GAlice =
{CloseFriends,Family,Coworkers} to organise her
online friends.
Definition 1: A privacy policy P is a tuple P = 〈A,E〉,
where A is the set of groups granted access and E ⊆ U
is a set of individual user exceptions.
The semantics of a group-based privacy policy in
most Social Media are: P.A are the groups that are
authorised (or granted) access to the item; and P.E are
a set of individual exceptions — either users in the
authorised groups who are denied access individually
or users who are granted access individually because
they are in the unauthorised groups (groups not ex-
plicitly granted access). Continuing the example above,
Alice defines her individual privacy policy for an item
as PAlice = 〈{CloseFriends}, {Charlie}〉, i.e., Alice
wants to share the item only with CloseFriends but
excluding Charlie.
2.2 Problem Statement
Given a set of negotiating users N = {n1, . . . , nk} who
co-own an item — i.e., there is one uploader ∈ N who
uploads the item to social media and the rest in N are
users affected by the item; and their individual (possibly
conflicting) privacy policies Pn1 , . . . , Pnk for that item;
how can the negotiating users agree on with whom, from
the set of the target users T = {t1, . . . , tm}, the item
should be shared?
This problem can be decomposed into:
1) Given the set of individual privacy policies
Pn1 , . . . , Pnk of each negotiating user for the item,
how can we identify if at least two policies have
contradictory decisions — or conflicts — about
whether or not granting target users T access to
the item.
2) If conflicts are detected, how can we propose a
solution to the conflicts found that respects as
much as possible the preferences of negotiating
users N .
3 MECHANISM OVERVIEW
We propose the use of a mediator that detects conflicts
and suggests a possible solution to them. For instance,
in most Social Media infrastructures, such as Facebook,
3Twitter, Google+ and the like, this mediator could be
integrated as the back-end of Social Media privacy con-
trols’ interface; or it could be implemented as a Social
Media application — such as a Facebook app — that
works as an interface to the privacy controls of the
underlying Social Media infrastructure. Figure 1 depicts
an overview of the mechanism proposed. In a nutshell,
the process the mediator follows is:
1) The mediator inspects the individual privacy poli-
cies of all users for the item and flags all the con-
flicts found (as described in Section 4). Basically,
it looks at whether individual privacy policies
suggest contradictory access control decisions for
the same target user. If conflicts are found the item
is not shared preventively.
2) The mediator proposes a solution for each conflict
found. To this aim, the mediator estimates (as
described in Section 5) how willing each nego-
tiating user may be to concede by considering:
her individual privacy preferences, how sensitive
the particular item is for her, and the relative
importance of the conflicting target users for her.
Conflict 
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Fig. 1. Mechanism Overview
If all users accept the solution proposed, it will be
applied. Otherwise, users will need to turn into a man-
ual negotiation by other means. Note that different ap-
proaches could be used to communicate the suggested
solutions to users and getting back their feedback, as
discussed in Section 7.
4 CONFLICT DETECTION
We need a way to compare the individual privacy pref-
erences of each negotiating user in order to detect con-
flicts among them. However, each user is likely to have
defined different groups of users, so privacy policies
from different users may not be directly comparable.
To compare privacy policies from different negotiating
users for the same item, we consider the effects that
each particular privacy policy has on the set of target
users T . Privacy policies dictate a particular action to
be performed when a user in T tries to access the item.
In particular, we assume that the available actions are
either 0 (denying access) or 1 (granting access). The
action to perform according to a given privacy policy
is determined as follows2:
2. Note that the definition of this function will vary according to the
access control model used, but it will be defined in a similar way. That
is, the idea is to be able to know, given a target user t, whether the
privacy policy will grant/deny t access to the item regardless of the
access control model being used.
Definition 2: Given an user n ∈ N , her groups Gn, her
individual privacy policy Pn = 〈A,E〉, and a user t ∈ T ;
we define the action function as:
act(Pn, t) =

1 if ∃G ∈ Gn : t ∈ G ∧G ∈ Pn.A ∧ t /∈ Pn.E
1 if ∃G ∈ Gn : t ∈ G ∧G /∈ Pn.A ∧ t ∈ Pn.E
0 otherwise
We also consider so-called action vectors ~v ∈ {0, 1}|T |;
i.e., complete assignments of actions to all users in T ,
such that v[t] denotes the action for user t ∈ T . When a
privacy policy is applied to the set of users T , it produces
such an action vector, where v[t] = act(P, t).
If all the action vectors of all negotiating users assign
the same action for all target users, then there is no
conflict. Otherwise, there are at least two action vectors
that assign different actions to the same target user, and
there is a conflict. In other words, a conflict arises when
some negotiating users would like to grant access to one
target user while the others would not. Formally:
Definition 3 (conflict): Given a set of negotiating users
N and a set of target users T ; a target user t ∈ T is
said to be in conflict iff ∃a, b ∈ N with individual privacy
policies Pa and Pb respectively, so that va[t] 6= vb[t].
Further, we say that the set of users in conflict C ⊆ T ,
is the set that contains all the target users that are in
conflict.
Algorithm 1 Conflict Detection
Input: N , Pn1 , . . . , Pn|N| , T
Output: C
1: for all n ∈ N do
2: for all t ∈ T do
3: vn[t]← 0
4: for all G ∈ Pn.A do
5: if ∃u ∈ G, u = t then
6: vn[t]← 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for all e ∈ Pn.E do
11: vn[e]← ¬vn[e]
12: end for
13: end for
14: C ← ∅
15: for all t ∈ T do
16: Take a ∈ N
17: for all b ∈ N \ {a} do
18: if va[t] 6= vb[t] then
19: C ← C ∪ {t}
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
The mediator runs Algorithm 1 to detect conflicts by
harvesting the users in conflict set C. The complexity of
the algorithm is polynomial and it mainly depends on the
number of negotiating users, target users, groups granted
access, and users in each group granted access. In the
worst case, the complexity is O(|U |3), when all users U
are negotiators and targets; all groups of all negotiators
are granted access; and, for each negotiator, there are as
4many groups as users or all users are in one group3. If
Algorithm 1 does not detect any conflict — i.e., C = ∅, it
will return to the users without changes to their preferred
privacy policies. If Algorithm 1 detects conflicts, the
mediator will then run the conflict resolution module,
which is described in the following section.
Example 1: Assume a set of users U = {Alice,Bob,
Charlie,Dan,Eve,Frank}. Negotiating users N =
{Alice,Bob} are in the process of deciding to which
target users T = {Charlie,Dan,Eve,Frank} they
grant access to a photo in which both of them
are depicted. Negotiating users defined the follow-
ing groups: Alice defined GAlice = {MyFriends} so
that MyFriends = {Charlie,Dan,Eve}; and Bob
defined GBob = {CloseFriends,Family} so that
CloseFriends = {Charlie,Eve} and Family =
{Dan,Frank}. Now, assume that negotiating users have
the following individual privacy policies for the photo:
Alice has PAlice = 〈{MyFriends}, {Eve}〉 so that
~vAlice = (1, 1, 0, 0) — i.e., only Charlie and Dan would
be granted access to the photo; and Bob has PBob =
〈{CloseFriends,Family}, ∅〉 so that ~vBob = (1, 1, 1, 1)
— i.e., all target users Charlie, Dan, Eve and Frank
would be granted access to the photo. As vAlice[Eve] 6=
vBob[Eve] and vAlice[Frank] 6= vBob[Frank], the set of
users in conflict is C = {Eve,Frank}.
5 CONFLICT RESOLUTION
When conflicts are detected, the mediator suggests a
solution according to the following principles:
• Principle 1: An item should not be shared if it is
detrimental to one of the users involved — i.e.,
users refrain from sharing particular items because
of potential privacy breaches [21] and other users
allow that as they do not want to cause any delib-
erate harm to others [3], [5].
• Principle 2: If an item is not detrimental to any of
the users involved and there is any user for whom
sharing is important, the item should be shared
— i.e., users are known to accommodate others’
preferences [3], [4], [5].
• Principle 3: For the rest of cases, the solution
should be consistent with the majority of all users’
individual preferences — i.e., when users do not
mind much about the final output [3], [4], [5].
We shall now describe the framework to model these
principles and AppendixA shows the proofs that the
framework follows the principles above. In a nutshell,
the mediator computes a solution to the conflicts as
detailed in Section 5.3, based on the three principles
above, which are operationalised as concession rules as
detailed in Section 5.2. Concessions rules are in turn
instantiated based on the preferred action of each user for
the conflict (dictated by each user’s individual privacy
policy) as well as an estimated willingness to change that
action (detailed in Section 5.1).
3. Recall groups are disjoint. Otherwise, the complexity is O(|U |4).
5.1 Estimating the Willingness to change an action
In order to find a solution to the conflict that can be
acceptable by all negotiating users, it is key to account for
how important is for each negotiating user to grant/deny
access to the conflicting target user. In particular, the
mediator estimates how willing a user would be to
change the action (granting/denying) she prefers for a
target agent in order to solve the conflict based on two
main factors: the sensitivity of the item and the relative
importance of the conflicting target user.
5.1.1 Estimating Item Sensitivity
If a user feels that an item is very sensitive for her4, she
will be less willing to accept sharing it than if the item
is not sensitive for her [21], [22]. One way of eliciting
item sensitivity would be to ask the user directly, but
this would increase the burden on the user. Instead, the
mediator estimates how sensitive an item is for a user
based on how strict is her individual privacy policy for
the item [19], so that the stricter the privacy policy for
the item the more sensitive it will be. Intuitively, the
lower the number of friends granted access, the stricter
the privacy policy, hence, the more sensitive the item is.
Moreover, not all friends are the same; i.e., users may feel
closer to some friends than others and friends may be
in different groups representing different social contexts.
Thus, both the group and the strength of each relation-
ship are considered when estimating the strictness of
privacy policies and, therefore, the sensitivity of items.
The mediator can use any of the existing tools to
automatically obtain relationship strength (or tie strength)
values for all the user’s friends for particular Social
Media infrastructures such as Facebook [23], [24] and
Twitter [25] with minimal user intervention. Even if the
mediator would not be able to use these tools, users
could be asked to self-report their tie strength to their
friends, which would obviously mean more burden on
the users but would still be possible. Whatever the pro-
cedure being used, the mediator just assumes that the tie
strength value assigned for each pair of friends a and b is
given by a function τ(a, b), so that τ : U×U → {0, . . . , δ},
where δ is the maximum positive integer value in the tie
strength scale used5.
Based on these values, the mediator considers how
strict is a user’s individual privacy policy as an estimate
of the sensitivity of an item by calculating the minimum
tie strength needed in each group to have access to the
item and averaging it across groups. That is, if a privacy
policy only grants users with close relationships (i.e.,
friends with high tie strength values) access to an item,
4. Note that we particularly stress that an item is sensitive for
someone. This is because the same item may be seen as having different
sensitivity by different people.
5. The maximum tie strength value δ depends on the tool used. For
example, in Fogue´s et al. [23] δ = 5; i.e., six levels of tie strength, which
would map to, for instance, the friend relationship as: 0-no relationship,
1-acquaintance, 2-distant friend, 3-friend, 4-close friend, 5-best friend.
5then the item will be estimated as sensitive, since the
privacy policy is very strict (i.e., the average minimum tie
strength across groups to have access to the item is very
high). On the contrary, if a privacy policy grants users
with low tie strengths across groups, then the item will
be estimated as less sensitive, since the privacy policy is
less strict.
Definition 4: Given a user n ∈ N , her groups Gn,
and her individual privacy policy Pn for an item, the
sensitivity of the item for n is estimated as:
Sn = 1| Gn |
∑
G∈Gn
Tn(G)
where Tn(G) is the strictness of the privacy policy in
group G, defined as the minimum tie strength needed in
group G to have access to the item:
Tn(G) = min
t∈G
f(n, t)
and f(n, t) is based on the tie strength between users
n and t. However, this function considers differently
situations where t is given access and situations where t
is denied access. In particular, if user t is granted access,
then function f returns the tie strength between users n
and t. On the contrary, if user t is denied access, then
this user must not be considered when determining the
policy strictness for the group and function f returns the
maximum tie strength value (recall that Tn(G) is defined
as the minimum value returned by function f for all
users in a group). More formally, f(n, t) is defined as
follows:
f(n, t) =
{
τ(n, t) iff act(Pn, t) = 1
δ iff act(Pn, t) = 0
5.1.2 Estimating the relative importance of the conflict
Now the focus is on the particular conflicting target user
— i.e., the target user for which different negotiating
users prefer a different action (denying/granting access
to the item). The mediator estimates how important a con-
flicting target user is for a negotiating user by consider-
ing both tie strength with the conflicting target user [26],
[27], [28] and the group (relationship type) the conflicting
target user belongs to [18], [20], [29], which are known to
play a crucial role for privacy management. For instance,
Alice may decide she does not want to share a party
photo with her mother, who has a very close relationship
to Alice (i.e., tie strength between Alice and her mother
is high). This signals that not sharing the photo with
her mother is very important to Alice, e.g., teens are
known to hide from their parents in social media [30].
Another example would be a photo in which Alice is
depicted together with some friends with a view to a
monument that she wants to share with all her friends.
If some of her friends that appear in the monument
photo also want to include Alice’s acquaintances, it is
likely she would accept as she already wants to share
with all her friends (whether close or distant). Thus, the
mediator estimates the relative importance of a particular
conflicting user considering both the tie strength with
this user in general and within the particular group (rela-
tionship type) she belongs to. In particular, the mediator
estimates the relative importance a conflicting target user
has for a negotiating user as the difference between the
tie strength with the conflicting user and the strictness
of the policy for the group the conflicting user belongs
to. If the conflicting target user does not belong to any
group of the negotiator; then the relative importance
is estimated considering the item sensitivity instead as
there is no group information.
Definition 5: Given a user n ∈ N , her groups Gn, and
a conflicting user c ∈ C, the relative importance of c for
n is estimated as follows:
In(c) =
{| Tn(G)− τ(n, c) | if ∃G ∈ Gn : c ∈ G
| Sn − τ(n, c) | otherwise
For instance, assume Alice would like to share
with all her friends —i.e., TAlice(Friends) = 1— but
not with Charlie, who is close friend of her —i.e.,
τ(Alice, Charlie) = 5. The relative importance would be
calculated as IAlice(Charlie) =| 1− 5 |= 4, which means
that the action Alice prefers for Charlie is quite important
to her; e.g., Alice could be creating an event in which she
invites all her friends except Charlie because the event is
a surprise for Charlie’s birthday, so sharing with Charlie
would mean ruining the surprise party. In the very same
way, if Alice would like to share an item only with
her best friend —i.e., TAlice(Friends) = 5, the relative
importance of denying access to an acquaintance would
be high too —i.e., if Peter is an acquaintance of Alice such
that τ(Alice, Peter) = 1, then IAlice(Peter) =| 5− 1 |= 4.
5.1.3 Estimating Willingness
Finally, the mediator estimates the willingness to change
the preferred action (granting/denying) for a conflicting
target user accounting for both the sensitivity of the item
and the relative importance of the conflicting target user
as detailed above. If both sensitivity and relative impor-
tance are the highest possible, then the willingness to
change should be minimal. On the contrary, if both sen-
sitivity and relative importance are the lowest possible,
then the willingness to change should be maximal. Thus,
we define willingness as a distance (in a 2-dimensional
space) between the values of both item sensitivity and
relative importance and the maximum possible values
for both — as shown above, both measures are defined
in tie strength units and have δ as their maximum value6.
We chose for this the Canberra distance7 instead of
6. The calculations and meaning for sensitivity and relative impor-
tance are different and they may render different values for the same
conflict, so they are considered as two different dimensions.
7. Given two n-dimensional vectors ~p and ~q, the Canberra distance
[31] is defined as:
d(~p, ~q) =
n∑
i=1
| pi − qi |
| pi | + | qi |
6other distances like Euclidean, Manhattan, or Chebyshev
because it is a relative and not absolute distance metric
— so that it would work in the same way regardless of
the δ value being used.
Definition 6: Given user n ∈ N , her preferred privacy
policy Pn, the maximum tie strength value δ, a conflicting
target user c ∈ C, the willingness of user n to accept
changing her most preferred action for c is a function
W : N × C → [0, 1] so that:
W(n, c) = 1
2
·
( | δ − In(c) |
δ + In(c)
+
| δ − Sn |
δ + Sn
)
Note that the only difference from a 2-dimensional
Canberra distance is that we divide by 2 the final result
to normalise the willingness into a real value within the
[0,1] interval for convenience to model concessions as
shown in the following section (Section 5.2).
Example 2: Suppose Example 1 and that we would like
to obtain the willingness of Alice and Bob to accept
changing their preferred actions for the conflicts found
C = {Eve, Frank}. Suppose also that the tie strength be-
tween users are those given in Table 1. Table 2 shows all
the willingness values for each of the conflicts and pos-
sible solutions. For instance, to calculate W(Alice,Eve),
the mediator first calculates the item sensitivity and the
relative importance of Eve as follows:
SAlice = 1| GAlice |
∑
G∈GAlice
TAlice(G) = TAlice(MyFriends) = 2
and
IAlice(Eve)= |TAlice(MyFriends)−τ(Alice,Eve)|= |2− 1|=1
Therefore, the willingness is:
W(Alice,Eve) = 1
2
·
( | δ − IAlice(Eve) |
δ + IAlice(Eve)
+
| δ − SAlice |
δ + SAlice
)
=
1
2
·
( | 5− 1 |
5 + 1
+
| 5− 2 |
5 + 2
)
=
1
2
·
(
4
6
+
3
7
)
≈ 0.55
We can see in Table 2 that the mediator would estimate
Alice’s willingness to grant Eve access to the item higher
than Alice’s willingness to grant Frank access to the item
— recall Alice’s preferred action for both Eve and Frank
is to deny access, so the mediator estimates willingness
to grant access. The reason for the estimated willingness
is that, though the item seems not very sensitive for
Alice (Sa = 2), Eve is closer to Alice than Frank, who
seems not to be friend of Alice at all or be a very
distant acquaintance because of a 0 tie strength. We can
also see in Table 2 that the mediator would estimate
Bob’s willingness not to share with Eve to be lower than
Bob’s willingness not to share with Frank — recall Bob’s
preferred action for both Eve and Frank is to grant access,
so the mediator estimates willingness to deny access. This
is because Eve seems to have higher relative importance
than Frank for Bob; i.e., Eve seems to be best friends with
Bob (high tie strength), so it is plausible to believe Bob
would definitely want to share with his best friend and
would be unwilling to accept not sharing with her.
Charlie Dan Eve Frank
Alice 4 2 1 0
Bob 3 2 5 2
TABLE 1
Tie strength for Example 2, with δ = 5 according to [23].
Eve Frank
Alice 0.55 0.43
Bob 0.34 0.71
TABLE 2
Willingness for Example 2.
5.2 Modelling Concessions
As suggested by existing research [3], [4], [5], negoti-
ations about privacy in social media are collaborative
most of the time. That is, users would consider others’
preferences when deciding to whom they share, so users
may be willing to concede and change their initial most-
preferred option. Being able to model the situations in
which these concessions happen is of crucial importance
to propose the best solution to the conflicts found —
one that would be acceptable by all the users involved.
To this aim, the mediator models users’ decision-making
processes during negotiations based on the willingness
to change an action (defined above) as well as on find-
ings about manual negotiations in this domain, like the
ones described in [3], [4], [5]. Users’ decision making
on continuous variables, like the willingness to change
an action, is commonly modelled using fuzzy sets that
characterize intervals of the continuous variables [32].
Figure 2 depicts the intervals the mediator considers for
the willingness to change an action, which can be low or
high8. Based on this, the following fuzzy IF-THEN rules
to model concessions in different situations as described
below according to the three principles stated above.
I do not mind (IDM) rule
Users are generally willing to accommodate others’ shar-
ing preferences [3], [4], so if they do not mind much
about which action is finally applied, they will concede
and accept applying the action that is not the most
preferred for them. In particular, if the willingness to
accept the action that is not the preferred one is high,
then this may mean that the user would not mind much
conceding and accepting that action for the conflicting
target user. Assuming a negotiating user a ∈ N , and
8. Note that by design, as we are dealing with privacy, we take a
conservative approach and the cutting point of exactly 0.5 is considered
low.
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a conflicting target user c ∈ C, this concession can be
formalised as the following fuzzy IF-THEN rule:
IF W(a, c) IS high THEN concede (IDM)
Note that concede means that user a would accept
changing her initial most preferred action to reach an
agreement. Thus, users that would initially prefer grant-
ing the particular conflicting target user access to the
corresponding item would accept denying access, and
users that would initially prefer denying the particular
conflicting target user access to the corresponding item
would accept granting access. For instance, Alice and
Bob could be depicted in a photo with very low sen-
sitivity — e.g., a photo in which both Alice and Bob are
depicted with a view to a monument — and both of
them could have defined privacy policies for the photo
so that all their friends can see it. Suppose that Charlie
is friend of Alice but is distant acquaintance of Bob,
so according to Alice’s privacy policy Charlie should
be granted access to the photo but according to Bob’s
privacy policy Charlie should not be granted access to
the photo. However, given that the photo is not sensitive
for Bob, Bob would probably accept sharing also with
Charlie and solve the conflict.
I understand (IU) rule
Even when the willingness to change an action is low
for some of the negotiating users, users do not want
to cause any deliberate harm to their friends and will
normally listen to their objections [4]. That is, if the item
may be detrimental to some of the negotiating users,
so that they prefer denying a conflicting target user
access and the willingness to grant access is low, then
other users whose most preferred action for the target
user is granting access and the willingness to accept
denying is also low would concede and accept denying
access to the conflicting target user. Indeed, considering
others self-presentation online has been reported as a
way of reaffirming and reciprocating user’s relationships
[4], [26]. Assuming a negotiating user a ∈ N , and a
conflicting target user c ∈ C, this concession can be
formalised as the following fuzzy IF-THEN rule:
IF W(a, c) IS low ∧ va[c] = 1 ∧
∃b ∈ N, W(b, c) IS low ∧ vb[c] = 0
THEN concede (IU)
For instance, Alice, Bob, and Charlie are depicted
together in a photo in which Bob is clearly inebriated.
Initially, Alice and Charlie might very much like to share
the photo with friends because Alice, Bob and Charlie
could agree they had a very good time together that
day in which the photo was taken. However, Alice and
Charlie would probably understand the privacy implica-
tions this may entail to Bob. Thus, if Bob opposes sharing
the photo, Alice and Charlie would probably accept not
sharing the photo.
No concession (NC) rule
For the other cases in which neither IDM nor IU ap-
plies, then the mediator estimates that a negotiating
user would not concede and would prefer to stick to
her preferred action for the conflicting target user. For
completeness, this can be formalised as the following
fuzzy IF-THEN rule assuming a negotiating user a ∈ N ,
and a conflicting target user c ∈ C:
IF W(a, c) IS low ∧
(va[c] = 0 ∨ (6 ∃b ∈ N :W(b, c) IS low ∧ vb[c] = 0))
THEN do not concede (NC)
For instance, when the willingness to accept granting
access to the item is low, users very much seek to
avoid sharing the item [21], because it can cause them
a privacy breach; i.e., a sensitive item ends up shared
with someone they would not like —e.g., in the example
above, Bob would most probably not accept sharing
the photo in which he appears inebriated with Alice
and Charlie’s friends because he might feel embarrassed
about the photo and would prefer that no one sees it.
5.3 Computing Conflict Resolution
The mediator computes the solution for each conflict
found by applying the concession rules defined above.
The solution will be encoded into an action vector ~o, so
that o[t] contains the action for target user t. If t is not
conflicting, the mediator assigns to this target user the
action shared by all negotiation users. If t is conflicting,
the mediator assigns to o[t] its proposal to solve the
conflict. To this aim, the mediator executes Algorithm
2. In particular, for each conflicting target user t:
• If for all negotiating users, their willingness to
accept changing their preferred action for the con-
flicting target user is high, then, according to con-
cession rule IDM, the mediator assumes that all
users are willing to concede if need be, so that the
final action to be applied for target user t can be
both grating and denying. In order to select one
8of these two actions, the mediator runs a modified
majority voting rule (Lines 3-6). In particular, this
function selects the action that is most preferred
by the majority of users. In case that there is a tie
— i.e., the number of users who prefer granting
and the number of users who prefer denying is
the same, then the uploader is given an extra vote.
Note that this function is only used if all the users
have a high willingness to accept the action that is
not the most preferred for them. That is, it does not
really make much of a difference for them which
action is finally taken, and all of them are willing
to concede (change their preferred action) to reach
an agreement.
• If there are users whose willingness to accept
changing their preferred action for the conflicting
target user is low (Lines 8-14), then the mediator
considers two cases: (i) if there are at least two
users with low willingness and different preferred
actions, then, according to concession rule IU, the
action to be taken should be denying the conflicting
target user access to the item in question; (ii) other-
wise, rule IDM applies so that the users that have
high willingness will concede and the user/users
who has/have low willingness will determine the
action that is finally chosen as the solution.
The complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(|C|×|N |2). That is,
for each conflict, we need to know for each negotiating
agent what is her willingness, which can be calculated
in constant time as the sensitivity would only need
to be calculated once for all conflicts, and the relative
importance of each particular conflicting user can be
obtained in constant time. Note that in the very worst
case; i.e., all users are negotiating users and all users
are at the same time conflicting, then the complexity of
Algorithm 2 would be O(|U |3).
Algorithm 2 Conflict Resolution
Input: N , Pn1 , . . . , Pn|N| , C
Output: ~o
1: for all c ∈ C do
2:
3: if ∀n ∈ N, W(n, c) is HIGH then
4: o[c]← modified majority(Pn1 , . . . , Pn|N| , c)
5: continue
6: end if
7:
8: if ∃a ∈ N, W(a, c) is LOW then
9: if ∃b ∈ N, W(b, c) is LOW ∧ va[c] 6= vb[c] then
10: o[c]← 0
11: else
12: o[c]← va[c]
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
Example 3: Suppose again Example 1 and consider
the willingness values calculated in Example 2. Table 3
shows the fuzzy set membership for negotiating users
Eve Frank
Alice HIGH LOW
Bob LOW HIGH
TABLE 3
Fuzzy Memberships of willingness for Example 3.
Alice and Bob in case they would accept changing their
most preferred action for the conflicting target users
C = {Eve,Frank}. We can see that for Alice and Eve
IDM rule applies, so that the mediator assumes that Alice
would concede (in this case, to accept granting Eve access
to the item). As Bob has willingness LOW to change his
preferred action for Eve, then the action suggested by
this user would be taken to solve the conflict, and the
computed solution would be to grant Eve access to the
item. Regarding Frank, we have a similar situation. In
this case, the willingness is HIGH for Bob, so that IDM
rule applies and Bob would concede. As there is only
one negotiating user (Alice) with willingness LOW, then
the action suggested by this user is taken to solve the
conflict. Therefore, the solution to the conflict would be
to deny Frank access to the item. The resulting action
vector for the item would be ~o = {1, 1, 1, 0}; i.e., Charlie,
Dan and Eve would be granted access to the item while
Frank would be denied access to the item.
6 USER STUDY
The aim of this section is to compare the performance of
our proposed mechanism to other existing approaches in
terms of what users would do themselves manually in
a number of situations. To this aim, we conducted the
user study described below.
6.1 Method
We sought to explore situations with different degrees
of sensitivity, as users’ behaviour to resolve conflicts
may be different depending on how sensitive items are.
However, this would have involved participants sharing
with us sensitive items of them. Participants sharing
sensitive information in user studies about privacy in
Social Media was already identified as problematic in
related literature [22], as participants would always seem
reluctant to share sensitive information, which biases the
study towards non-sensitive issues only. Indeed, this re-
luctance to share information that may be sensitive with
researchers during user surveys is not only associated
with studies about privacy and Social Media, but it has
also been extensively proven to happen in many other
survey situations, including other scientific disciplines
such as psychology [33]. A possible alternative to avoid
this problem could be one in which participants just self-
report how they behave when they experience a multi-
party privacy conflict without asking for any sensitive
information of them. However, the results obtained in
that case may not match participants’ actual behaviour
9in practice, as previous research on privacy and Social
Media showed that there is a dichotomy between users’
stated privacy attitudes and their actual behaviour [34].
As a trade-off between these two alternatives, we chose
to recreate situations in which participants would be
immersed, following a similar approach to [35], maximis-
ing actual behaviour elicitation while avoiding biasing
the study to non-sensitive situations only. To this aim,
we described a situation to the participants and asked
them to immerse themselves in the situation by thinking
they were a particular person in a particular photo that
was to be shared through a Social Media site and that
they were tagged in it, and participants showed very
different individual privacy policies and concession deci-
sions depending on the situation as detailed below. Each
participant was presented with 10 different scenarios.
Scenarios were different across participants as they were
composed of: (i) one photo involving multiple users; and
(ii) a conflict created based on the individual privacy
policy the participant specified for the photo. As we
had 50 participants (as detailed below), we were able to
gather participant-specified data relative to 500 different
scenarios. Photos referred to different situations (e.g.,
travelling, playing with friends, partying, dating, etc.)
and were of different sensitivities a priori — though the
participants were asked to specify their privacy policy for
the photo as their first task for each scenario (as detailed
below), which was different according to how sensitive
each photo was for each participant.
We developed a web application that presented the
participants with the photos, stored the individual pri-
vacy policy they selected for each photo, generated
conflicts, and stored whether or not participants would
concede during a negotiation in the scenarios presented.
For each scenario, participants completed the following
two tasks using the application:
1) Definition of the Individual Privacy Policy. Each
participant was asked to define her/his most pre-
ferred privacy policy for each photo.
2) Conflict and Concession Question. Once the par-
ticipants defined their individual privacy policy
for the photo, a conflict was generated. That is, we
told the participants that one or more of the other
people in the photo had a different most preferred
action for one particular person, specifying the re-
lationship type and strength the participant would
have to this person. For instance, if the participant
only wanted to share the photo with close friends,
we told her/him that the other people in the photo
wanted to share the photo with someone that
was her/his acquaintance. Where multiple options
were available to generate a conflict, we chose one
of them randomly. Then, we asked participants
whether or not they would concede and change
their most preferred action for that person to solve
the conflict with the other people depicted in the
photo.
6.2 Participants
We recruited 50 participants via e-mail including univer-
sity students, academic and non-academic staff, as well
as other people not related to academia who volunteered
to participate in the study. Participants completed the
study online using the web application developed to that
end (as detailed above). Before starting, the application
showed the information to be gathered and participants
needed to consent to continue. Table 4 summarises par-
ticipants’ demographics (gender, age, job), Social Media
use (number of accounts in different Social Media sites,
and frequency of use), and if they were concerned about
their privacy in Social Media (Priv. concerned).
Variable Distribution
Gender female (42%), male (58%)
Age 18-24 (18%), 25-30 (36%), 31-40 (24%),
41-50 (10%), 51-60 (6%), 60+(6%)
Job Agriculture(4%), Arts(2%), Computers(26%),
Design(6%),Education(16%),Engineering (10%),
Management(4%),Media(2%),
Research(14%),Sales(2%), Other(14%)
# accounts 0(4%),1(30%),2(18%),3(8%),4(12%),4+(28%)
Freq. of use monthly- (18%), monthly (10%),
weekly(10%), daily (26%), daily+(36%)
Priv. concerned not much(36%), yes(26%), very much(36%)
TABLE 4
Participants’ demographics, Social Media use, and
privacy concern.
6.3 Results
The results gathered through the web application were
compared to the results that would have been obtained
if our proposed mechanism was applied to the scenar-
ios and if state-of-the-art automated voting mechanisms
were applied. To this aim, we looked at the privacy pol-
icy defined by the participant and the conflict generated
by the application for each situation. This determined
participants’ most preferred action for the conflict (to
be considered by our proposed mechanism and state-
of-the-art voting mechanisms), as well as the willingness
to change it (used to determine the concession rule our
mechanism would apply in each case). In particular, we
compared the results that would have been obtained
applying our proposed mechanism to those that would
have been obtained applying the general voting mecha-
nisms used in state-of-the-art automated approaches:
• Uploader overwrites (UO), the conflict is solved se-
lecting the action preferred by the user that uploads
the item. This is the strategy currently followed by
most Social Media Sites (Facebook, etc.).
• Majority voting (MV) [11], the conflict is solved
selecting the action most preferred by the majority
of the negotiating users.
• Veto voting (VV) [2], if there is one negotiating user
whose most preferred action is denying access, the
conflict is solved by denying access to the item.
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Figure 3 shows the results for each of the above voting
mechanisms as well as the results for our proposed
mechanism for automated conflict resolution (labelled
AR in the figure). In particular, it shows the percentage of
times each mechanism matched participants’ concession
behaviour in the scenarios above. We can observe that
our proposed mechanism AR clearly outperformed UO,
MV, and VV. This is because these mechanisms lack
enough flexibility to model actual user behaviour across
different situations in this domain, as they only consider
the most preferred action for each negotiating user as
a vote without considering the particular situation. We
can also observe that UO is very far from what users
did themselves, which is mainly due to UO not being
collaborative at all —i.e., the preferences of the other
parties are not considered. MV performs a bit better
than UO, but it is still far from what participants did
themselves. This is mostly due to the situations in which
even if the majority of users would like to share an
item in the first instance, they could reconsider this if
there is/are one/multiple user/(s) that would prefer not
sharing because this could have privacy consequences
for them.
We can also see in Figure 3 that VV performs better
than UO and MV. This result confirms that negotiating
users are many times open to accept not sharing an item
if this can cause privacy breaches to one of them — as
also modelled in our proposed mechanism AR. However,
VV is too restrictive to be suitable for all situations.
This is because there are also situations in which the
user/s whose most preferred action is denying access
may not mind granting access due to many reasons. In
these cases, VV would suggest solutions that mean losing
sharing opportunities. For instance, as stated earlier,
Alice and Bob could be depicted in a photo with very low
sensitivity — e.g., a photo in which both Alice and Bob
are depicted with a view to a monument — and both of
them could have defined privacy policies for the photo
so that all their friends can see it. Suppose that Charlie
is friend of Alice but is distant acquaintance of Bob,
so according to Alice’s privacy policy Charlie should
be granted access to the photo but according to Bob’s
privacy policy Charlie should not be granted access to
the item. However, given that the photo is not sensitive
for Bob, Bob would probably accept sharing also with
Charlie. VV would not consider this concession, and the
solution to solve the conflict would be not sharing with
Charlie, so it would be a lost sharing opportunity and
Alice may not even accept the solution. In contrast, our
mechanism is able to adapt to the particular situation,
being as restrictive as VV if needed but also considering
the cases in which concessions about granting access are
to happen —as the example above, in which the I do
not mind (IDM) rule would have picked that Bob would
concede, so that the final solution would be to share with
Charlie (recall the item was not sensitive to Bob).
We also sought to explore more closely how each of the
concession rules in our proposed mechanism contributed
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NC - No concession).
to its performance as well as how state-of-the-art voting
mechanisms would work in each case. Table 5 shows for
each concession rule the number of times that each rule
would have been applied (# Instantiations) in the 500
situations and Figure 4 shows the performance of each
approach broken down by the concession rule that would
have been applied for each situation. We can observe
that performance was similar across concession rules
for our proposed mechanism AR; i.e., once a particular
concession rule instantiated for a situation, it usually
matched users’ behaviour with respect to concessions.
In particular, we observe that the three concession rules
in our mechanism obtain better results than the state-of-
art approaches. We can also observe that the performance
of state-of-the-art voting mechanisms significantly varied
according to the concession rule AR would apply. This
confirms the fact that static ways of aggregating pref-
erences (as those used in state-of-the-art voting mecha-
nisms) are not desirable in this domain, because the con-
cessions that may happen to resolve multi-party privacy
conflicts clearly depend on the particular situation —as
captured by the variables considered by AR’s concession
11
rules; i.e., individual privacy preferences of each user,
the sensitivity of the item to be shared, and the relative
importance of the conflicting target user.
Concession Rule # Instantiations
I do not mind (IDM) 172
I understand (IU) 111
No concession (NC) 217
Total 500
TABLE 5
Number of times each AR concession rule would have
been applied.
Finally, we sought to find any correlation that could
exist between participants’ data —demographics, social
media use and privacy concern— and whether or not
participants behaved according to the concession rule
instantiated for each situation. To this aim, we calcu-
lated the information gain (IG) — i.e., the reduction
in entropy — that each variable produced on whether
the participant followed the corresponding rule or not
once it was instantiated, and the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (CC). Table 6 summarises the values for each
rule. IGs and CCs were negligible and not statistically
significant (i.e., p > 0.05). Thus, users’ characteristics
like the privacy concern, age, gender, profession, studies,
and social media use did not have any significant effect
on whether participants followed a concession rule once
the rule was instantiated for a particular situation. Note,
however, the particular concession rule instantiated in
each situation depended on the individual privacy policy
of each user, the sensitivity of the item for the user,
and the relative importance of the conflicting target
user as stated above, which may vary from participant
to participant. The important thing is that once a rule
was instantiated, the variables above did not influence
whether the particular instantiated rule was successful in
matching user behaviour or not. In other words, users’
characteristics (e.g., demographics, privacy concern, etc.)
may determine the individual privacy policies users
choose, which in turn determine the rules that are in-
stantiated for a given situation; but users’ characteristics
do not determine whether users’ concession behaviour
matches that of the rule instantiated. This suggests the
mechanism proposed in this paper captures general user
behaviour and would be able to adapt to both different
situations and users.
7 DISCUSSION
The results of the user study suggest that our mechanism
was able to match participants concession behaviour
significantly more often than other existing approaches.
The results also showed the benefits that an adaptive
mechanism like the one we presented in this paper can
provide with respect to more static ways of aggregating
users individual privacy preferences, which are unable
to adapt to different situations and were far from what
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3
IG CC IG CC IG CC
Age 0 0.04 0 0 0 -0.10
Gender 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.13 0 -0.06
Job 0.08 -0.18 0.08 -0.17 0.04 0.11
Studies 0 0.18 0 0.16 0 0.017
Freq. of use 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.07
# Accounts 0 0.14 0 0.16 0 -0.05
Priv. Concern 0 0.13 0 0.16 0 0.04
TABLE 6
IGs and CCs for each rule based on participants’
demographics, social media use, and privacy concern.
the users did themselves. Importantly, our mechanism is
agnostic to and independent from how a user interface
communicates the suggested solutions to users and gets
feedback from them. First, privacy visualisation tools al-
ready proved to be highly usable for social media could
be used to show and/or modify the suggested solution,
such as AudienceView [36], PViz [37], or the Expandable
Grid [38]. Second, users could define a default response
to the solutions suggested, e.g., always accept the sug-
gested solution without asking me9, which, as shown in
the evaluation (Section 6), would actually match user
behaviour very accurately. Other suitable defaults could
be applied based on approaches like [39], [40], [41], or
users’ responses could be (semi-)automated based on the
concession rules instantiated in each situation, using any
of the machine-learning approaches shown to work very
well in social media privacy settings [18], [19].
We considered the individual privacy preferences of
each individual involved in an item, sensitivity of the
item and the relative importance of the target to de-
termine a user’s willingness to concede when a multi-
party privacy conflict arises. Although accuracy results
presented in the previous section are encouraging, this
does not mean that there are no other factors that
play a role to determine concessions. For instance, in e-
commerce domains the strength of relationships among
negotiators themselves is also known to influence to
what extent negotiators are willing to concede during
a negotiation [42]. Future research should look into how
other factors could help further increase the accuracy of
the mechanism presented here.
Finally, we focused on detecting and resolving conflicts
once we know the parties that co-own an item and have
their individual privacy policies for the item. However,
we are not proposing a method to automatically detect
which items are co-owned and by whom they are co-
owned. This is a different problem that is out of the
scope of this paper. For example, Facebook researchers
developed a face recognition method that correctly iden-
tifies Facebook users in 97.35% of the times [43]. Also,
it could be the case that a person does not have an
9. This would be similar to the tagging mechanism of Facebook,
which users can configure to be notified for confirmation about tags
before they become active or to just go ahead without confirmation.
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account in a given social media. In that case, her face
could be preventively blurred [44]. Blurring faces may
seriously diminish the utility of sharing information in
social media, but it could also be a good alternative if no
agreement is reached between negotiators to ensure an
individual (not collective) privacy baseline is achieved.
8 RELATED WORK
Until now, very few researchers considered the problem
of resolving conflicts in multi-party privacy management
for Social Media. Wishart et al. [9] proposed a method to
define privacy policies collaboratively. In their approach
all of the parties involved can define strong and weak
privacy preferences. However, this approach does not
involve any automated method to solve conflicts, only
some suggestions that the users might want to consider
when they try to solve the conflicts manually.
The work described in [10] is based on an incentive
mechanism where users are rewarded with a quantity
of numeraire each time they share information or ac-
knowledge the presence of other users (called co-owners)
who are affected by the same item. When there are con-
flicts among co-owners’ policies, users can spend their
numeraire bidding for the policy that is best for them.
Then, the use of the Clark Tax mechanism is suggested to
obtain the highest bid. As stated in [12], users may have
difficulties to comprehend the mechanism and specify
appropriate bid values in auctions. Furthermore, users
that earned much numeraire in the past will have more
numeraire to spend it at will, potentially leading to
unilateral decisions.
In [12] users must manually define for each item: the
privacy settings for the item, their trust to the other
users, the sensitivity of the item, and how much pri-
vacy risk they would like to take. These parameters
are used to calculate what the authors call privacy risk
and sharing loss on segments — they define segments
as the set of conflicting target users among a set of
negotiating users. Then, based on these measures all of
the conflicting target users in each segment are assigned
the same action. That is, all of the conflicts that a set
of negotiating users have would be solved either by
granting or denying access. Clearly, not considering that
each individual conflict can have a different solution
leads to outcomes that are far from what the users would
be willing to accept. Moreover, due to how the privacy
risk and sharing loss metrics are defined, solutions are
likely to be the actions preferred by the majority of
negotiating users, which can be many times far from the
actual behaviour of users as shown in Section 6.
There are also related approaches based on voting
in the literature [2], [11]. In these cases, a third party
collects the decision to be taken (granting/denying) for
a particular friend from each party. Then, the authors
propose to aggregate a final decision based on one of
the voting rules already been described in Section 6 —
i.e., uploader overwrites (UO), majority voting (MV), and
veto voting (VV). These approaches are static, in the
sense that they always aggregate individual votes in the
same way by following the same voting rule. Thus, these
approaches are unable to adapt to different situations
that can motivate different concessions by the negotiating
users, which makes these approaches unable to match
the actual behaviour of users many times, as shown
in Section 6. Only in [13], the authors consider that a
different voting rule could be applied depending on the
situation. However, it is the user who uploads/posts the
item the one who chooses manually which one of the
voting rules (UO,MV,VV) to apply for each item. The
main problem with this — apart from having to specify
the voting rule manually for every item — is that the
choice of the voting rule to be applied is unilateral. That
is, the user that uploads the item decides the rule to ap-
ply without considering the rest of the negotiating users’
preferences, which becomes a unilateral decision on a
multi-party setting. Moreover, it might actually be quite
difficult for the user that uploads the item to anticipate
which voting rule would produce the best result without
knowing the preferences of the other users.
Finally, the problem of negotiating a solution to multi-
party conflicts, has also been recently analysed from a
game-theoretic point of view [45], [46]. These proposals
provide an elegant analytic framework proposing ne-
gotiation protocols to study the problem and the so-
lutions that can be obtained using well-known game-
theoretic solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium.
However, as shown in [45], these proposals may not
always work well in practice, as they do not capture the
social idiosyncrasies considered by users in the real life
when they face multi-party privacy conflicts, and users’
behaviour is far from perfectly rational as assumed in
these game-theoretic approaches — e.g., refer to [3], [4].
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present the first mechanism for detect-
ing and resolving privacy conflicts in Social Media that
is based on current empirical evidence about privacy ne-
gotiations and disclosure driving factors in Social Media
and is able to adapt the conflict resolution strategy based
on the particular situation. In a nutshell, the mediator
firstly inspects the individual privacy policies of all users
involved looking for possible conflicts. If conflicts are
found, the mediator proposes a solution for each conflict
according to a set of concession rules that model how
users would actually negotiate in this domain.
We conducted a user study comparing our mechanism
to what users would do themselves in a number of situ-
ations. The results obtained suggest that our mechanism
was able to match participants’ concession behaviour
significantly more often than other existing approaches.
This has the potential to reduce the amount of man-
ual user interventions to achieve a satisfactory solution
for all parties involved in multi-party privacy conflicts.
Moreover, the study also showed the benefits that an
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adaptive mechanism like the one we presented in this
paper can provide with respect to more static ways of
aggregating users’ individual privacy preferences, which
are unable to adapt to different situations and were far
from what the users did themselves.
The research presented in this paper is a stepping
stone towards more automated resolution of conflicts in
multi-party privacy management for Social Media. As
future work, we plan to continue researching on what
makes users concede or not when solving conflicts in this
domain. In particular, we are also interested in exploring
if there are other factors that could also play a role in
this, like for instance if concessions may be influenced by
previous negotiations with the same negotiating users or
the relationships between negotiators themselves.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE PRINCIPLES
Principle 1: Content should not be shared if it is detri-
mental to one of the users involved
Proof: We prove that solutions proposed by the
conflict resolution algorithm (Algorithm 2) follow this
principle by contradiction. Suppose that Principle 1 does
not hold, thus given a negotiating user a ∈ N who does
not want to share an item with a conflicting target user
c ∈ C (i.e, va[c] = 0) and doing this is detrimental to her
(i.e., W(a, c) is low), the solution to the conflict will not
respect the decision made by a and it will be sharing
the item (i.e., o[c] = 1). However, Algorithm 2 can only
output value 1 for o[c] in two cases:
1) As a result of a modified majority (line 4). How-
ever, this is only executed when there is not a user
u ∈ N such that W(u, c) is low, which contradicts
our assumption.
2) As a direct assignation from a user who prefers
to share the item (line 12). However, this is only
executed when there is not another user u ∈ N
such that vu[c] = 0 and W(u, c) is low which
contradicts our assumption.
Principle 2: If an item is not detrimental to any of the
users involved and there is any user for whom sharing
is important, the item should be shared.
Proof: We prove that solutions proposed by the
conflict resolution algorithm (Algorithm 2) follow this
principle by contradiction. Suppose that Principle 2 does
not hold, thus given a negotiating user a ∈ N who wants
to share an item with a conflicting target user c ∈ C (i.e,
va[c] = 1) because doing this is important to her (i.e.,
W(a, c) is low), and that there does not exist a negotiating
user b ∈ N who does not want to share the item with
c (i.e., vb[c] = 0) and the item is detrimental to her (i.e.,
W(b, c) is low), the solution to the conflict will not respect
the decision made by a and it will be not sharing the item
(i.e., o[c] = 0). However, Algorithm 2 can only output
value 0 for o[c] in three cases:
1) As a result of a modified majority (line 4). How-
ever, this is only executed when there is not a user
u ∈ N such that W(u, c) is low, which contradicts
our assumption.
2) As a direct assignation of not sharing (line 10).
However, this is only executed when there is
another user u ∈ N such that vu[c] = 0 andW(u, c)
is low which contradicts our assumption.
3) As a direct assignation from a user who prefers not
to share the item (line 12). However, this would
only be executed when there exists another user
u ∈ N such that vu[c] = 0 andW(u, c) is low which
contradicts our assumption.
Finally, the proof for Principle 3 is omitted because of
lack of space, but it is trivial to prove that for all other
cases not considered in Principles 1 and 2, the modified
majority voting will aggregate all users’ preferences.
